




































JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY-4TH-EDITION (AQUINO)-2022


Abstract
It has been argued that cultural relativism has only created greater problems for 
humanity in the sense that it has helped polarize the world along the line of difference. Put 
differently, many have argued that, cultural relativism in its many strands, if allowed to 
stand will plunge the world into a theatre of intolerance and ultimately, conflict. This 
paper attempted to debunk such assertions and argued that relativism especially from its 
cultural dimension is what confers identity on a group. It also made the point that we have 
to acknowledge difference before we can tell where there are overlaps among human 
cultures. The paper adopted arguments from relativists like Rorty, Kuhn, Quine and 
Anyanwu to place relativism on an enviable pedestal. The analytical, critical and 
reconstructive methods of philosophy were employed in this work. The analytical method 
helped in clarifying concepts like relativism, culture, subjective, ethical and identity. The 
critical method was employed to examine the positive aspects of cultural relativism while 
the method of reconstruction was necessary in linking the views of the advocates already 
mentioned. The paper recommended that even if there would eventually be a communion 
of world cultures, it is quite vital to first give primacy to that which defines a person – his 
cultural heritage. This summarily underscores the primal support for cultural relativism.

Keywords: Relativism, Culture, Constructivism, Universalism, Reality

Concept of Relativism
th

Most theorists hold the view that the idea of relativism is traceable to the works of a 5  
century philosopher Democritus. Further research reveals that Protagoras was the first to 
hold views that may be described as relativistic when he professed that:

Man is the measure of all things, of the things that they
are that they are, and the things that they are not that 
they are not. Russel, (1995:94).

This implies that every man is the setter of his standard. What he considers as truth, good, 
evil, real and meaningful are all dependent on him. To put this differently, it means there is 
nothing that can be classified as objective – there is no objective truth by which one can be 
adjudged as being right or wrong, good or bad etc.

Before we go any further, it is pertinent to first consider an analysis of the term 
'relativism.' For pundits like Brian Longhurst, relativism is a doctrine of social knowledge 
that has as its tenet the claim that all thought is socially determined. (Longhurst, 1989:75) 
this is to say that what a group socially accept as viable or valuable to its interest is what it 

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A CASE FOR CULTURAL RELATIVISM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD

M.E. ABAM, Ph.D



projects. For Edward Craig, relativism is an idea that states that truth, reality and what is 
right or wrong depends on our point of view (1998:189). The bottom line here is that there 
is no objective truth or reality as presented by the foundationalists and realists. Relativsm 
is seen in different forms. It could be gleaned from different perspectives – subjective, 
ethical, and epistemological. It can also be rationalistic, perceptual and conceptual. Let us 
at this juncture shed some light on a few of the strands.

Subjective Relativism:

This is in pursuance with the dictum of Protagoras that “man is the measure of all things.” 
The major thrust is that whatever appears to me as the truth is the truth to me irrespective 
of how you perceive it and whatever appears as the truth to you is the truth irrespective of 
my take on it. Be that as it may, some may argue that this position can easily lead to chaos 
and anarchy.

 Ethical Realtivism:

This doctrine denies the existence of one correct moral code that applies to and binds all 
societies (Barcallow 1994:38). Put differently, there are diverse moral beliefs and 
standpoints across society such that what may be seen as right or wrong differ from 
society to society. Invariably, the grounds of moral beliefs are held to be relative to 
particular position whether such position is individualistic or communal. This position 
has been attacked on the grounds that it can easily lead society to the abyss. There may be 
break down in morality as all beliefs and practices are equally legitimated, there being no 
means of evaluating good or bad practices.

Epistemological Relativism:

Epistemological relativism or what Robert Kirk (1999:36) calls “True – for   - us” 
relativism states that 'true' always really means “true – by – the – standards – of – X where 
X could be a group or a whole society”. An example might be a theory which understands 
truth in terms of what is satisfactory to believe. Such a theory allows that truth may differ 
from group to group or society to society. Here there is a break away from the idea of a 
culturally independent truth. Since in traditional epistemology belief and truth are 
considered essential ingredients of knowledge, and since in relativism what is considered 
as true and worth believing depends on agreement, it becomes the case that knowledge 
depends solely on a group's or society's point of view or consensus. We can glean a 
difference between epistemological relativism and subjectivism. The difference lies in 
the fact that while it is the case that they both emphasize the relativity of truth, one applies 
strictly to singular entities while the other transcends the singularity to situate at the 
collective.

Ethno Methodology or Relativism:
Ethno methodology is constructed on the model of such labels as 'ethno botany' and 'ethno 
medicine', which are terms for the body of native lore in the realms of botany and 

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medicine. Ethnomethodology is a discipline that examines the general cognitive methods 
through which 'natives' understand their world. Thus in this variant of relativism, reality is 
generated by the process through which social agents “think about, describe and account 
for it, and the consensus they reach about it” (Collin, 1997:27). This variant of relativism 
makes the assumption that social agents of different nativity would view the world 
differently.

Cultural Relativism

This is the main strand of relativism this work is anchored on. We had to bring in other 
variants to help make the concept explicit. More so, we may not be wrong if we posit that 
all the forms of relativism so far considered are ensconced in the big umbrella 'cultural 
relativism'. We shall now attempt to explain this concept as well as other notions that may 
be associated with it, its features before we make a case for it. But first, what is the 
meaning of the word culture?

To respond to the posed question it is pertinent to go to the etymology of the word itself. 
The word 'culture' is derived from the Latin word 'colere' whcich means to till or cultivate.  
It refers to production by means of labour and the application of skills over an extended 
period of time of something that does not exist in unmodified nature. There is both the 
technical and non technical sense of culture. Our preoccupation in this paper is the 
technical sense. A technical sense of the term culture is exemplified in E. B. Tylor's 
Primitive Culture. According to him, culture is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, beliefs,art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired 
by man as a member of society. Again, Kroeber and Kluckhohn say that culture 
'designates those aspects of the total human environment, tangible and intangible, which 
have been created by man'(Dunn, 1972:284).

We can deduce from the above that culture consists of certain patterns of behavior which 
are recurrent and which exist within a social framework and which may serve as a vehicle 
of identification for those who exhibit such pattern of behavior. The conception of culture 
Kroeber and Kluckhohn express is a little removed from the material elements as they 
seem to be more in tone with the immaterial aspect of culture hence the choice of the word 
'intangible.' In the same vein, Mary Lee Ledbetter defines culture as “the way of life of a 
human society which includes language. A culture produces similar thought among a 
people. To learn about culture one may ask: what language do a people speak?”Ledbetter 
(2002:1188)

The reason why language must not be left out according to Ledbetter is because language 
appears to be the canopy under which any culture strives. One cannot talk knowledge, 
beliefs, cognitive process and so on without talking about language. Furthermore, O'Hear 
sees cultural relativism as a deterministic doctrine which makes culture too definitive of 
the group to which it belongs, in that any reception of outside influence is going to seem 
either impossible in appealing to values not recognized by insiders or undesirable in 
diluting  the purity of distinctiveness of a culture (1998:784). This is to say that the ways 

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of men cut across diverse societies leaving no culture insular. This may be what Gyekye 
had in mind when he opined that there is what is called 'descriptive cultural relativism' and 
'normative cultural relativism.' Normative cultural relativism implies that there is no such 
thing as common body of social facts, corresponding to a shared human standard of 
cognition. Instead, there are several bodies of fact, each relative to the standards relative 
in a particular society. This may not be unconnected with Gyekye definition of cultural 
relativism as “that doctrine that denies objectivity or universality of cultural values” 
(1999:32). To reiterate, cultural relativism holds that values that are held by a people are 
only true and valid for that cultural group. Hence our abstraction, perception, conception 
of the real, or the good, our conception of rationality, is as valid as any other, there being 
no simple or common – neutral standard by which the various goods or values can be 
evaluated.

The Three Fundaments of Cultural Relativism

i. Since the value and practices of each culture or society are valid for that culture 
or society, any attempt by someone outside --that culture to evaluate it would be 
irrelevant, otiose, inconsequential, and an unjustified interference.

ii. Since it is impossible for an outsider to fully appreciate or understand the 
menaces of the meanings and symbols of a different culture system, there would be 
no basis for anyone's judging and evaluating another's culture.

iii. Since an alien would have no real basis for evaluating another culture, any 
attempt on their part to do so would always and unavoidably be conditioned by 
their own background values and beliefs. This would result in a necessary 
distortion of the judgments that would be made, as these can only reflect the 
outsider's cultural perspectives.

Constructivism and Cultural Relativism

The constructivist sees reality as a creation of the way we think and talk. In other words, 
reality is generated from language (since our thoughts and speeches are impossible 
outside the use of language). And since language is relative to culture, it becomes the case 
that reality is culturally determined. The constructivist thesis comes in two ways – social 
constructivism and scientific constructivism. According toCollin, scientific 
constructivists are interested in the construction of facts about the physical world while 
social constructivists are concerned with the generation of social facts (1997:2). It is in 
constructivism that we see a bifurcation of reality into social and physical, both 
depending on cultural constructs.

Another appendage of cultural relativism is the thesis of incommensurability. According 
to Gyekye, this thesis states that there is no common measure or scale for evaluating 
different cultures (Gyekye, 37). The incommensurability thesis revolves around the idea 
that cultures cannot be placed in a single normative scale, for they cannot be weighed 

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from the same scale. There is no common ground for them. To this end, beliefs, canon of 
rationality, moral values, concepts and theoretical frameworks, perceptions and reality is 
relative to cultures and there is no meeting point; this is the basic argument of the 
incommensurability thesis.

From the fore going, we may easily glean certain factors of what qualifies as cultural 
relativism. The most basic of such factors is that it applies to a group of people rather than 
to individuals. It is of course possible to argue that an individual living within a 
community can have her own culture. While this argument may be valid, it is equally a 
fact that whatever that individual culture is, it has to be subordinate to the collective 
culture. It has to be in consonance with what is accepted.

Another point worth making is that cultural relativism recognizes and leaves room for 
heterogeneity of ideas. It does so because it does not approve of a monolithic view of 
reality. In cultural relativism, reality is culture dependent. It also does not subscribe to the 
supremacy of one culture to another. It is succinctly put, predicated on the post-modernist 
assertion that there is no absolute truth.

 Defense of Cultural Relativism

The prime argument to examine that supports relativism is the one termed “cosmic 
porridge” (Kirk, 52). This argument greatly derives from the constructivist thesis that 
reality is totally dependent on us, and it represents those categories of arguments that 
rotate around the fringes of absurdity. According to the cosmic porridge argument all that 
really exist apart from the perceiver is an indeterminate something; this has no features of 
its own (Kirk, 52). The crux of the argument is that we somehow impose features on the 
'undifferentiated stuff'- features which depend on which concepts we happen to have. On 
the one hand something really exists 'out there', but on the other hand, nothing else can be 
said about it, which is objectively true. Hence, nothing else exists which is real.

Another extreme interpretation of this argument is that there is no indeterminate stuff out 
there at all. Rather everything that exists is all in the mind. The import that these have on 
cultural relativism is seen when we imagine a situation in which we have a community of 
people who happen to have the same way of imposing features on the 'indeterminate.'That 
peculiar way of imposing features would be their culture. The implication is that other 
communities with their own differentiating peculiarities would have different realities. 
Let us now consider the views of philosophers like Wittgenstein, Quine, Rorty and others.
In his works Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein states that philosophy “is a battle 
against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein, 
1967:109). The point he is making here is that philosophical problems especially those 
bothering on discourses on reality, arise as a result of wrong use of words. He claims then 
that it is the task of philosophy to ensure that language is properly used. He went further to 
maintain that our everyday language is governed by rules or norms, which is depicted as 
the language – game. Invariably, people brought up in different cultures will have 
different language – games with their own rules. To this end, what belongs to a language 

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game is a whole culture. Elsewhere he states that “our language game only works, of 
course, when a certain agreement prevails” (1967:76) where the purported agreement is 
reached among people who already play the game (people of the same culture).

The above implies that each culture has its language, which conforms to a certain 
language – game. A language game is the way language is used and meanings generated. 
It is a language game that determines what is true or false, because truth and falsity 
depends on statement's conformity to the rules and norms of language. Consequently, 
truth, falsity, reality and meaning are all dependent on the rules/norms of a language-
game. Where language differs, reality differs and there is no objective source of what is 
correct or not.

More still, Quine's view on cultural relativism can be gathered from his opinion on the 
indeterminacy of radical translation, inscrutability of reference and ontological relativity. 
In “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, he proclaimed that there is no demarcation between 
natural sciences and speculative metaphysics. He, in his empiricism without dogma, 
seems to have removed any foundation for what is true and meaningful and maintains that 
our knowledge of reality is man-made (Quine 1963:129).

To Quine, reality transcends empirical verifiability or immediate experience. As a matter 
of fact reality is like a field of force which is composed of different myths or posits which 
themselves are cultural; at the centre of the field are myths about gods and theoretical 
entities, while at the periphery are physical objects. He says that the myth of physical 
objects have only been more efficacious in explicating reality than other myths not 
because they are of different kinds to other myths – their differences are only a matter of 
degree. He writes Physical objects are conceptually imported intothe situation as 
convenient intermediaries – not by definition of terms of experience, but simply as 
irreducible posits… (Quine, 131) 

Invariably, what Quine seems to be alluding to is that there is no one way of seeing the 
world. Reality is an embodiment of myths of varying degrees of potency which are all 
culture dependent. This implies that where culture differs, the myth of its reality will also 
be different thus giving credence to relativity – hence his work Ontological Relativity. In 
this work, Quine subscribes to the indeterminacy of translation because it is very possible 
to have two different translations in English of a remote language, which may both elicit 
the same observable behavior and disposition to behave on the parts of the speakers of 
both languages. In conditions as this, it is impossible to ascertain the right translation. For 
instance, as Quine exemplifies, if a native sees a rabbit and overtly behaves in such a way 
as to utter 'gavagai', the English linguist may be justified for the sake of communication to 
translate the utterance to “rabbit.” However, it would be missing the point philosophically 
to just accept that the indeterminacy of radical translation arises from the fact that “we are 
wondering whether to translate a native expression 'gavagai' as 'rabbit' or as “undetached 
rabbit part” or as “rabbit stage”, we can never settle the matter…”(Quine 1969:28). 

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We might likely argue that the matter can be settled by denotative or ostensive means. 
Quine interjected at this point by saying that 'rabbit' is a term of divided reference. He 
writes that:

The indeterminacy of translation now confronts us however, cutting across extension and 
intension alike. the terms “rabbit,” “undetached rabbit parts”, and “rabbit stage” differ not 
only in meaning: they are true of different things. Reference itself proves behaviourally 
inscrutable (Quine, 35).

The implication of the above assertion on language and culture is seen in Quine's idea of 
homophonic rules and translation. He explains that we all have an individual and peculiar 
string of phonemes in our idiolect, which gives our characteristic interpretation of our 
environment (Quine, 46). Thus we as individuals of the same culture have our ways of 
carrying “each string of phonemes into itself”.

Homophonic rules that inform homophonic translation are acquired, 
Quine argues, via one's interaction with one's culture. Hence, 
homophonic translation is a product of homophonic rules, which in turn 
depends on culture. By implication, where culture differs, homophonic 
rules and translation differ. This view shows then that people from 
different environment cannot interpret reality in the same way. 
Furthermore, the result of interpretation provided that one is observing 
the same object with an alien, is unclear.

In pursuance with the tenets of cultural relativism, Richard Rorty maintains a pragmatist 
stance, which in our opinion culminates into relativism. “heaims to undermine the 
reader's confidence… in 'knowledge' as something … which… has foundations” (Rorty 
1990:7). It is his negative attitude towards foundationalism that qualifies him as a post-
modernist. His take on relativism finds expression his work titled Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature. In this work, he borrowed from John Dewey when he opined that 
justification is a social phenomenon rather than a transaction between the knower and 
reality; and James view that “truth is what is better for us to believe” (Rorty, 9-10), rather 
than as the accurate representation of reality.

…the notion of 'accurate representation' is simply an automatic and empty 
compliment which we pay to those beliefs which are successful in helping us do what we 
want to do (Rorty, 10).

Consequently, for Rorty, the attempt to explicate 'rationality' and 'objectivity' in terms of 
conditions of accurate representation is a self-deceptive effort to eternalize the normal 
discourse of the day (Rorty, 11).

In what he calls epistemological behaviourism, Rorty explains that the community is the 
source of epistemic authority. The above statements credited to Rorty can be construed as 
meaning that in a way, truth and hence, reality is culture determined. To corroborate his 

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Abam                        A Case For Cultural Relativism In A Globalizing World



argument, Rorty says: To say that the world is out there, that it is not our creation, is to say

,… that most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not 
include human mental states. To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that 
wherethere are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human 
languages are human creation (Rorty, 10).

Rorty is a bit different from philosophers of the analytic school because he does not hold 
onto the notion that reality is represented or is the product of a cognitive process. In other 
words, the usual argument that reality is determined by the way we structure or organize 
and represent objects, which in turn is determined by language or culture does not go 
down well with Rorty. His own approach to relativism is pragmatic. What is true or real, 
rather than being a product of a conceptual scheme, is a product of what a society or 
culture agrees on, “justification is a … convention … of social practice” (Rorty, 1989:5). 
In other words, knowledge (beliefs, truth, reality), is what is workable or convenient for a 
culture to adopt.

When 'incommensurability' is mentioned in a philosophical discourse, it invariably leads 
one to the branch of philosophy of science where Kuhn and Ferayabend hold sway. Their 
views are quite relevant in this work. Their works to all purposes reflect the tenets of 
relativism even though Kuhn denies this. He holds that progress in science is often 
characterized by revolution and paradigm shift, in which an emergent scientific theory 
claims to better deal with any perceived anomaly. Kuhn enthused that there is always a 
concerted effort by proponents of an old rival theory to maintain the integrity of that 
theory. This leads to a relativism of truth-values, which are held by the different 
competing scientific communities involved. Again, what counts as a paradigm is 
community dependent this, succinctly put is why Kuhn writes that “scientific knowledge, 
like language, is intrinsically the common property of a group…” (Kuhn 1970:210).

Ferayabend's contribution to this debate can be gleaned from his opinion on 
incommensurability as well as his notion that science (as presented by the West is the very 
paradigm of institutionalized rationality) is not necessarily superior to other fields of 
inquiry. In his irrationalism, he contrasts science with voodoo, astrology and the likes and 
argues that other inquiry cannot be ruled by recourse to some general criterion of 
scientificity and rationality (Chalmers, 1990:141). Thus we can see from the fore going 
that what informs his idea of methodological anarchism and his assertion that “anything 
goes”.

Let us at this juncture mention the views of a notable African philosopher on the 
problematic in person of K. C. Anyanwu. Anyanwu maintains that language, apart from 
being a vehicle of communication, expresses reality. He argues that our language plays 
important role in perception and interpretation of reality. In other words, our language 
contains certain framework, which ensures that our pattern of interpretation, generation 
of meaning and subsequent communication depends on it. The consequence is that where 
language differs, interpretations, consideration of what is meaningful, and so on also will 

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differ. Hence, what is 'the real' is relative to the culture from which the language emanates 
(Anyanwu 1982:127).

Conclusion 
Most arguments point to the fact that if allowed to stand, cultural relativism will plunge 
the world in to further crisis.Our response to this is that the world is already in a worse 
crisis occasioned by liberal minded 'universalists'. The crisis this time is not direct conflict 
as seen in terms of war but rather amoral one. We now witness moral crisis all over the 
world - bisexualism, gay men, lesbianism, to mention but a few.  Some governments are 
having diplomatic problems with those that may not want to adopt their kind of 
liberaluniversalists' ideas which mayalso lead to diplomatic problems that might 
culminate in war. In Nigeria for instance, few openly display acts mentioned above in the 
name of universalism.This is a direct consequence of 'liberal universalists' ideas. ' Critics 
are of the opinion that cultural relativism alleges to preach tolerance while in the real 
sense as pointed out by Williams, Doyal and Harris, Bidney and Wiredu is back-handed 
racism, tribalism and ethnocentrism, which are all basic ingredients for conflict. The 
question is: should we for fear of being termed tribal and racist imbibe practices alien to us 
as hinted above? Our answer is no. We conclude on the note that, we would rather be 
termed tribal, ethnocentric and racist than allow those features that confer identity on a 
group erode us in the name of cultural universalism. More so, reality is too broad to be 
viewed from universal lenses. The more cultures are encouraged to engage their reality, 
the more we come to knowledge about our world. To this end, cultural relativism must be 
emphasized.

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Edward Craig. 1989. “Relativism”, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 8. New 
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EmmethBarcallow. 1994. Moral Philosophy. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
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Firm Collin. 1997. Social Reality. London: Routledge.

Mary Lee Ledbetter. 2002. 'Culture'. The World Book Encyclopedia Vol. 4. Chicago: 
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Kwame Gyekye. 1999. Beyond Cultures: Perceiving a Common Humanity, Ghanaian 
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…………………………….. 1966. Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
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……………………… 1969. Ontological Relativity and other Essays. New York: 
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